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INTRODUCTION
"The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential
considerations of national policy, with the assistance and cooper-
ation of industry, agriculture, labor, and state and local govern-
ments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and
resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner
calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and
the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded
useful employment opportunities, including self-employment , for
those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power. "-*-
The philosophy embodied in the above paragraph from the
Employment Act of 19^6 declared economic stability and balance as
a deliberate objective of the federal government. This recognition
of the evils of reliance on an automatic market to determine the
economic fate of the society led to a positive governmental approach
to economic stability. This legislation was an aftermath of the
Depression and designed as a partial panacea to help prevent a
recurrence of the depths which the automatic market mechanism had
led the economy. The concepts of "necessary adjustment," "recession,"
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 196SJ, p. 170.
and "downswings" were discredited after the prolongation of the
depression, but the means to prevent such phenomena were not univer-
sally accepted. The controversy over the adverse or beneficial
effects of the New Deal policy was interrupted by World War II.
The Employment Act of 19^6 did not make the New Deal mistake
of proclaiming public works as the cure for depression. The Act
placed responsibility of the President, the Council of Economic
Advisors, and the Joint Economic Committee of Congress to analyze
the activity or inactivity of the economy. Proper policies to keep
the economy operating at a level consistent with the accepted
trinity of maximum employment, economic growth, and purchasing power
were then to be implemented.
The various tools of monetary and fiscal policy were to be
implemented to meet the objectives of this legislation. Initially
these policies were biased toward maintaining "full-employment"
and adequate economic growth because of the "depression psychosis"
that prevailed as the result of the devastating decade of the 1930 f s.
The recession of 1957-58 with its corresponding insufficient demand
and failure of governmental action to compensate for this drop in
demand led to unemployment rates much higher than acceptable under
terms of maximum employment and sufficient growth. The stimulating
policies of the government that led to continuing expansion during
the Kennedy Administration created a new problem. The problem of
maintaining this expansion at maximum employment without adequately
devising a policy to correct inflation at less than the full employment
level then came into view.
The tendency of prices to rise at le3s than full employment
levels is due to the structural characteristics of the labor and
product markets. This tendency was analyzed by the Council of
Economic Advisors for the 1956-57 inflation.
The impact of sectoral price increase was to induce wage
increases in these industries which set the pattern for wage bargains
throughout the economy. The administered pricing in the power sectors
caused a general price rise in other industries which were not
experiencing excess demand. This wage-price pattern held infla-
tionary consequences that could not be effectively remedied by
existing monetary or fiscal policy.
The domestic wage-price instability became more evident as
the weakening of the international economic position of the United
States caused more concern over the internal wage-price relationships.
For political and social reasons, the current account became the
center of inquiry in this problem; hence, the cost-push inflationary
pressures became more noticeable.
The lack of an effective policy to remedy cost-push inflation
and the fears of the balance of payments problem necessitated the
search for a public policy that could correct this situation. The
center of attention was then shifted from the problems of unemployment
to those of price stability. This shift developed an immediate need
for some mechanism to pursue the central problem of price instability.
The wage-price guideline policy was initiated in 1962 by President
Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors to fill this void.
This policy will be described and analyzed within the scope
of this study. The origin and evolution of the policy will first
be analyzed to indicate its importance and direction. The second
chapter will discuss why the policy was adopted and alternative
policies to correct the wage-price problems. The third chapter
will review European experiences with wage-price policy and the
surrounding circumstances that influenced such a policy. The
last chapter will analyze the problems of implementing such a
policy in the United States and evaluate the probability of such a
policy being successful in correcting the economic ills of the
economy.
CHAPTER I
ORIGIN AND DESCRIPTION CF WAGE-PRICE
GUIDELINES IN TEE UNITED STATES
The origin of wage-price guidelines as a means of govern-
mental policy was officially first introduced in the United States
in the 1962 Economic Report of the President . They were introduced
as a measure to maintain price stability in the economy while
attempting to decrease unemployment and increase the rate of
economic growth. The absence of any policy to deal effectively with
cost-push inflation, which occurred without excess demand because
of the existence of vast power segments in the industrial structure
and the corresponding power over wages and prices in the economy by
these segments, led to a search for a policy to deal with this
problem. The wage-price guidelines were accepted as the most
feasible method to cope with this problem. This policy was concep-
tualized much earlier by academic economists. Several European
countries applied similar policies after World War II to solve
inflationary problems, but these policies were originated because
of the respective countries 1 reliance on world trade. The second
Eisenhower Administration considered these policies to correct
inflationary pressure, but did not officially advocate such policies.
The general guidepost for wages is that the annual rate of
increase of total employee compensation (wages and fringe benefits)
per man-hour worked should equal the national trend rate of increase
in output per man-hour, 2 The general guidepost for prices is that
prices should remain stable in those industries where the increase
in productivity equals the national trend j that prices can appro-
priately rise in those industries where the increase of productivity
is smaller than the national trend j and that prices should fall in
those industries where the increase of productivity exceeds the
national trend.
3
This restatement of the guidelines attempts to keep the
average unit labor cost in the economy constant by balancing increases
in wages for certain groups of workers with reductions to other
groups. Industries that are experiencing above-average increases
in productivity should decrease their prices to offset increases of
prices in industries with productivity gains below the national
average. With this procedure the average level of prices and wages
would remain stable.
With strict adherence to these guidelines, the owners of
labor and capital would share the increases in productivity at the
same rate they are now sharing. The short-run swings of the shares
of gross income would then be eliminated, and the constant percentage
share of this income would not add to the inflation experienced by
^Economic Repor t of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 196&T, p. W.
3 Ibid
. . p. 90.
the wage-price spirals of the past two decades. The distribution
of income has not essentially changed since World War II; only the
short-run swings with labor's share rising in recession and falling
during expansion have occurred.
The structure of some segments of the United States economy
into oligopolistic units allows such firms to exercise market power
that is not restricted by competitive pricing. The financial power
and size of individual firms in some industries affords these firms
the power to establish administered prices. The prices so estab-
lished may be in the economic best interest of these firms, but
such a pricing mechanism may not be in the best interests of the
public. The private interests of these firms are not always equated
with the public interest. The particular problem of this conflict
is the effect of administered prices on the national economy.
The organizational power structure of oligopolistic firms
and some labor unions allows these units to extract a higher price
for their products than they would receive if competition were more
rigorous. If this market structure creates a series of price
increases that causes price instability throughout the economy, the
conflict of private and public interests must be reconciled by public
policy. The government authorities have a statutory obligation to
promote the objectives of the 19*+6 Employment Act} hence, the guide-
line policy was so established to meet this obligation.
The rationale for the implementation of the guidelines is
^Ibid.
that these large segments of the economy that exercise the private
power should also exercise private responsibility for the public
interest* The philosophy of the guidelines is that if the public
is informed of the significance of the major wage bargains and price
itci '. . .. on :'.:o HttM I Imtlfitlf IfcM ttMQT IM cr-r.to Ml itmos-
in which the parties to such decisions will exercise their
responsibly. J
The guideposts are to be the sid3 by which the public can
evaluate the effects of these decisions on the national interests.
If either wage or price decisions exceed the productivity gulde-
posts
v
then the public can be aware of the effects on the public
interest and ezert their influence on the participants so that the
national interest is served. This approach is designed to strengthen
the national economy by indirectly limiting the private power of
business and labor to set prices without the use of mandatory
controls by government over wage and price decisions. This would
leave collective bargaining to determine the wage rate within the
legal rules presently established, and to allow each firm to set
its price for goods with the informed public to exert Its influence
on violators of the public interest.
Thi« policy would retain the free market mechanisms to
determine the value of goods and the distribution of Income to the
various factors of production within the framework of the "American
tradition 11 without allowing these instruments of free enterprise to
5Ecenomic ReDcrt of the President (wishington: U.u, Govern-
ment Printing (m©e, 19W\ p. 11.
damage the public interest. The productivity guidelines would then
be the "yardstick" of public interest by which the public can deter-
mine the effect of these wage or price decisions on the national
interest.
The guideposts would be influenced by various types of
governmental action to implement these guides without mandatory
control. The establishment of an early warning system to keep a
close watch on wage and price developments was designed to draw
attention to major actions by either business or labor that flout
the public interest in noninflationary price and wage standards.
6
Antitrust action and an attempt to resist legalized price-fixing
where competition does prevail were further avenues of attracting
attention to guidelines violations. Study of special, detailed
analyses of price or wage increases in key sectors of the economy
would be conducted to determine need for wage or price increases
and reporting of findings to the public to substantiate guideline
influence. Presidential influence to oppose legislative enact-
ments that threaten to raise costs and prices and to support those
that will stabilize or reduce costs and prices was designed to be
another incentive to follow the guidelines. 7 Another avenue of the
governmental pressure to supplement and strengthen guideposts would
be manpower, education, and rehabilitation programs to increase the
supply of qualified workers and to increase their productivity. The
Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Pr inting Office , 1964-77 P* iTI
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965T7 P. 13.
10
following measures are also applicable to enhance the guideline policy:
manipulation of federal stockpiles to prevent unnecessary shortages}
defense procurement, agricultural, and other policies to be adjusted
to contribute to stability of prices: and Fair Labor Standards
legislation and government pay increases to be consistent with the
guideposts." With these influences, the guidelines are to be able
to avoid inflation even at full employment without arbitrary controls.
The Council of Economic Advisors recognized that producti-
vity change and determination of which measure to use destroys any
absolution in this policy. Secondly, the indeterminate answer as
to the best distribution of the total product among labor or nonlabor
factors also makes the guidelines in fact a guide rather than a rule.
The third reason is that wage3 and prices among industries are not
responsive exclusively to productivity trends.
The first limitation on wage-price guideline policy is the
problem of determining productivity. The term "productivity" may
be defined as the ratio of output to any or all of the inputs em-
ployed in production. 9 Productivity can be increased by techno-
logical progress resulting from innovations in the method of organ-
ization of production and in improving the quantity and quality of
capital available per manhour. This process includes economies of
scale which increase output and allow for more specialization which
could then reduce the overhead expenses. Technological innovation
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 19667, p. 12.
9john W. Kendrick. "Productivity, Costs and Prices: Concepts
and Measures, "Wages
f
Prices . Profits and Productivity (Harriman,
New York: The American Assembly, June 1959), Part II, p. 38*
11
anut be accompanied by a similar change in the quality of labor as
new skills demanded Tor the improved process must be met by corre-
sponding skills ox labor, xhe final determinant is the change in
the efficiency with which th«3e resources are utilized.
Since statistical techniques are not adequate to differ-
entiate and identify the effect on output of aiiy of the input variables,
the concept of labor productivity is commonly used as the measure of
total productivity. Labor productivity relates the total output only
to the labor input and measures only quantitative changes in labor
input without considering the qualitative changes such as education,
training, and health. Labor productivity does not measure changes in
productive efficiency generally, since they are influenced by sub-
stitution of capital for labor and by savings in materials as well as
by technological change
.
Although several studies have been directed on the use of
total productivity by weighing each input, the productivity index
used in the determination of the guidelines is a labor productivity
index. The data used to determine productivity changes for the
guidelines is the Bureau of Labor Statistics series which measures
the labor input in terms of manhours paid for from establishment
data. There are three different B.L.S. indexes for determining the
labor input: (1) manhours paid for as determined by established
data j (2) manhours worked as determined from labor force data
gathered by Census Bureau; and (3) number of employed persons as
10 Ibid., p. hi.
12
determined by the Census Bureau. ** Use of these three unweighted
indexes givee a variation in productivity trends depending on the
time interval used. The following table shows a comparison of these
series with total productivity trends as determined by John W.
Kendricks in his study for the National Bureau of Economic Research.
This table shows the variations in productivity trends as
the measure f productivity varies. For the last time period the
three B.L.S. indexes yield roughly the same results because total
manhours paid, total manhours worked, and number of employed persons
changed at similar rates, but this does not apply in the other two
time periods because of different rates of change among the variables.
Kendrick»s weighted average gives a lower rate of change because of
its attempt to adjust labor input to the changes in quality of labor.
The 190+ Report introduced for the first time the definition
of trend productivity. The Council of Economic Advisors defined trend
productivity as the average annual percentage change in output per
man-hour during the last five years. 12 The estimation of the trend
rate was based on the following study conducted by the Council.
From these data the Council of Economic Advisorr established
the national trend rate of productivity to be 3«2 percent. This
established the guideline determination, but the Council chose not
ents-^Abraham L. Gitlow, The National Wage Policy : Anteced
and Application (New York: New York University, 196m-), p. 12.
12Sheldon W. Stahl. "The Wage-Prict Guideposts in Retrospect1
;
Monthly Review, (March-April, 1966), p. 7.
TABLE 1
coMPAfltscw akgsg iff^fgyff^ or labor productr\rmf»
Average /jmual
Percentage ifete Of Growth
"" .*'/. c ,v
..
SB
Labor Productivity l&iexes X9**7~60 1957*62 1958-63
::.l. .- Wiiimmii (iw.^or ore*)
B.I*. .— aasployeea
Keodrick—TJhvaightel Mannours
S.33
1:8 —
e
3.16
3.0$
.-
eriea do not include years 1961-6M •
Abraham U Gitlw, ffee national feaae Policy:
and Application (lev Yorki
* /ittecei
7f p>* 12«
to have this formula be a fixed rule. The five-year average rose
from 3.2 to 3.6 percent in 1966, but the Council refused to in rease
the guidelines because they attributed this gain to be cyclical.
This decision shows the difficulty of chosing the appropriate inter-
val and deriving the final measure.
The attitude concerning the distribution of the total product
between labor and nonlabor incomes has changed since the initial
wage-price policy was stated in 1962. The 196*f Report of the Council
of Economic Advisors stated that bargaining over the shares of in-
come would be consistent with guideline policy if it were within the
bounds of noninflationary price behavior. This statement means that
wage or profit shares may increase in an industry or firm so long
as the price behavior does not exceed productivity gains. The 1962
statement of the guidelines was prefaced by this statement, "If,
as a point of departure, we assume no change in the relative shares
of labor and nonlabor incomes in a particular industry, then a
general guide may be advanced for noninflationary wage behavior. "^-3
The 196*f statement relaxes the condition that functional redistri-
bution of income is contrary to a noninflationary price level by
stating that the income redistribution must be accompanied by a
stable price level. The restatement of the basic policy abolishes
the initial assumption that the existing distribution of income is
in fact and in justice the optimal one, but at the same time it
ignores the fact that wage increases may be passed on in the form
of price increases.
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1962*57 PP« 188-89.
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The third reason for using this policy as a guide rather
than a rule was the fact that wages and prices among industries
should be responsive to forces other than productivity trends.
Wage increase in excess of the general guide would be justifi-
able on the grounds of equity and of effeciency for resource al-
location. The equity considerations involved wage increases in
excess of guidelines where an industry or occupation had wage
rates exceptionally lower than those of comparable types of labor.
The resource allocation consideration was to induce labor into an
industry with a labor shortage. Wage rate increases less than
general guidelines are justifiable if the industry could not find
jobs for its entire labor force even at levels of general full
employment and where an industry or an occupation had exceptionally
high wage rates compared to wage returns to similar labor. Similar
modifications were applied to price level responses to ths guidelines.
Prices could rise more rapidly, or fall more slowly, than guide-
lines where costs other than labor had risen or if the price in-
crease was necessary to attract capital for needed expansion.
Prices would rise more slowly, or fall faster, than the guidelines
where profits were higher than ordinary return for a comparable
risk.
When fears of inflationary pressure began to grow in 196*f,
the Council of Economic Advisors restated the modifications more
strictly. The revision of their previous modifications stated,
"the modifications should apply only to relatively few cases as
the most constructive private policy in the great majority of
17
situations would be to arrive at price decisions and wage bargains
consistent with the general gir ^ts."!^
These restatements changed the role of the guidelines
from a guide to a rule. The shift in the nature of the policy was
accompanied by numerous informal sanctions to enforce this rule.
The nature of this policy assumed a much different character than
that anserine -•' in the original statement of the policy. The policy
threw off this "educational cloak" as the medium of informed public
opinion and assumed the new character of formula control over wage
and price decisions. The new role as a rule evolved without further
perfections in method because of the combination of changing econ-
omic and political conditions. The present stage in the evolution
of guideline policy is not considered to be its last change. The
basic reasons why this evolution has taken place will be examined
in the next chapter.
•
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965), p. 119.
CHAPTER II
REASONS AND RATIONALE FOR GUIDELINE POLICY
The shift of emphasis from full employment to price
stability with an adequate level of employment occurred during the
second Eisenhower administration. The fear of inflation and the
need for price stability replaced the previous goals and policies
directed toward full employment. The "new inflation" or cost-push
inflation placed new and greater pressures on the government to
develop a policy to counteract such price Instability.
The inflation that occurred before this period was charac-
terized by an excess demand for goods and services over the amount
that could be supplied at the prevailing price level. Established
monetary and fiscal policies were adequate to control these pressures
by tightening credit, increasing taxes, or decreasing spending.
The cost-push variety of inflation is characterized by the
wage-price spiral with wage increases being either an active or
passive stimulant for price increases. The activist school contends
that wage demands and subsequent increases that exceed increased
productivity must raise the price level, which in turn stimulates
increased wages because of increased cost of living. Policy measures
to control such price instability then lead to unemployment and the
conflict between the goals of full employment and price stability.
19
Research by Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow led to a modified
Phillips curve which stated that if wages in the United States
increased by only the amount of productivity gain there would be
five to six percent unemployment, and that if the economy were to
have only three percent unemployment it must accept an inflation-
ary price level of four to five percent. 15
The power structure in the labor market according to the
activist thesis was the cause of the price instability. This thesis
concluded that the most effective means to correct such price be-
havior would be to curb the power of the labor unions to prevent
such an initial wage increase.
The passivist school contended that wage increases were not
the primary cause of the price instability, but only an attending
factor. This thesis contends that monetary policy to create full
employment caused a demand-pulled inflation with wage increases be-
ing the passive factor. The wage-price spiral in such circumstances
was the resulting effect of the excess expenditure to satiate the
demand and not the cause for such price behavior.
Regardless of which school one might choose to accept,
the end result was that some level of unemployment must be accepted
in order to maintain price stability. The depression psychosis had
been overcome by inflation psychosis. The acceptance of unemploy-
ment as the pawn for price stability became the dominant theme in
policy considerations.
l^Neil W. Chamberlain, The Labor Sector (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 678.
20
The insensitivity of prices and wages to decreases in de-
mand due to the structural nature of the market created policy-
problems. Because of this insensitivity to moderate changes in
demand, the elimination of aggregate excess demand will not sub-
stantially choke off inflation without necessarily involving sub-
stantial employment.^-" A shift in the composition of demand then
leads to a general rise in the price level without an overall in-
crease in demand or an upward push for wages. Since prices and
wages are "sticky" as demand decreases, this increase is not off-
set because the sectoral increase in those expanding industries
causes a similar wage increase demand of labor in all other sectors.
The other unions follow the pattern set by the excess demand in-
dustry; consequently, the costs and prices for all goods are
increased even in the face of falling demand. This sectoral phen-
omenon that causes price instability is a modified combination of
both demand-pull and cost-push inflation. The downward inflexi-
bility of prices and wages in the face of decreased demand then set
a floor under each successive price increase giving the economy an
inflationary bias.
This study of the behavior of prices and costs in the
market structure of our economy stresses the importance of the
flexibility of prices and wages to changes in demand rather than in
actual changes in productivity for price stability. If this down-
^-"Charles Schultze, Recent Inflation in the United States f
Study Paper Number One for the Joint i&onomic Committee of the
86th Congress in connection with their "Study of Employment. Growth,
and Price Levels" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959)»
p. 1.
21
ward rigidity can not be alleviated, then unemployment and excess
capacity may be required occasionally to halt the price rise.
The cost increases which did occur flow from the sectors
in which excess demand was present, but the cost increases did
not result from an autonomous wage push. -*-7 Excess demand in the
capital goods industries caused higher prices throughout the economy
because of higher material costs and through the mechanisms of
rising wage rates in the period from 1955-1957. The increase in
demand and output of this selected industry led to wage gains
without an excess demand for labor. The following table shows the
effect of wage and price changes brought about by this market
phenomenon.
This shows that 62 percent of rise in industrial prices
occurred in capital goods industries even though wages rose almost
as fast in the other industries as the wages in the excess demand
industries.
This analysis points out the problems associated with a
market structure that does not react according to competitive price
theory because of the structural makeup of the markets for both
labor and goods. Traditional monetary and fiscal policy can not
control these sectoral excesses of demand because restriction of
aggregate demand is more likely to raise costs by reducing produc-
tivity than it is to lower costs by reducing wages and profit
margins. ^° With the realization that a repression of aggregate
17Ibid., p. 121
l8 Ibid., p. 133.
TABLE 3
PRICES AND HOURLY EARNINGS IN CAPITAL GOODS
AND OTHER INDUSTRIES, 1955-57*
Commodity Group Wt. in
W.P.I.
1955-57 Price
Increases
Percent Contri-
bution to total
change
Increases in
average hour-
ly earnings
A. Capital goods
and associated
commodities
B. Other indus-
trial goods in
W. P. I.
All industrial
commodities
30
70
15.0
lf.0
100 7.3
11.7
10.1
10.5
Charles >3chultze, Recent Inflation in the United States,
Study Paper Number One for the Joint Economic Committee of the
86th Congress in connection with their "Study of Employment.
Growth, and Price Levels" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1959), P. 118.
23
demand through monetary and fiscal policies can not control the
changing composition of demand in a dynamic economy, the two al-
ternatives of either using selective controls over these sectors
or accepting a moderate price increase are available.
This dynamic disturbance is accentuated by the fact that
competition is not stringent enough to keep prices from rising in
absence of excess demand. These market structures allow for prices
to be administered rather than determined by price system forces.
This raises two questions that must be considered: first,
is inflation evil, and secondly, what policies should be adopted to
correct the oligopolistic pricing system that influences this price
behavior.
The long run trend of prices for the last one hundred and
twenty years has been an average increase of one and one-eighth
percent per year according to a study by Simon Kuznets. ^ This
rate of price increase is classified as creeping inflation. The
Joint Economic Committee of Congress stated that inflation is un-
just whether it creeps or gallops. 2^ This conclusion was based on
the redistribution effect of inflation on income and wealth accord-
ing to the ability of people to protect themselves against its
effects.
^Seymour E. Harris, The Incidence of Inflation : Or Who
Gets Hurt
. Study Paper Number Seven for the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the 86th Congress in connection with their "Study of
Employment, Growth, and Price Levels" (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1959), p. 91
20Staff Report on Employment . Growth , and Price Levels
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 10.
2fc
The balance-of-payments problem that occurred at this
time added fuel to the fire evolving around the inflationary bias
of the economy. The dollar shortage and gold crisis brought de-
mands for stable prices to retain our international competitive-
ness and to relieve pressures created by this illiquidity. The
net foreign trade advantage fell to a level of 13^ million dollars
in 1959.^ This export surplus drop from previous levels also
added to the fears of the consequences of our economy^ inflation-
ary bias. Fears that wage increases had reduced the competitive-
ness of our economy called for policies to restrain this trend and
to return our international advantage.
The following tables illustrate the international wage
and price movements in selected countries at the time of the dis-
cussion of the fears of Americans pricing themselves out of the
international market. Although these tables do not include changes
in the exchange rate, they do show that in general the price history
of the United States has been more than satisfactory compared to
international price movements. 22
These comparisons of international price movements seem
to show that the urgent need for control over wage and price policy
were somewhat overheated. The pleas for the need of stable prices
as a prerequisite for adequate economic growth also seem to follow
in the path of the inflationary psychosis that prevailed.
2lEconomic Report £f £he. President (Washington i U. S.
Government
22Harris f p. 110.
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TABLE 5
COMPARISONS CF DOMESTIC DELATIONS IN 1957*
19*+8«100 1953-100
Wholesale
Prices
Chile
Argentina
Indonesia
Brazil
Japan
Peru
Columbia
Mexico
Australia
France
United Kingdom
Sweden
Netherlands
West Germany
Canada
Belgium
U. S.
India
Switzerland
Philippine
Italy
Venezuela
Cuba
1,880
372
291
27*f
205
20**
183
159
150
l*+3
117
115
113
113
108
103
103
99
97
Cost of
Living
1,650
590
3^7
3^7
195
209
206
200
201
185
153
lh7
152
117
127
115
118
115
111
lCfc
132
120
90
Wholesale Cost of
Prices Living
Chile 696 636
Brazil 195 212
.Argentina ••• 182
Indonesia MM* 163
Columbia 160 l*+0
Peru 136 127
Mexico 135 Itt
France 119 111
Sweden 108 113
Australia 108 113
united Kingdom 107 118
Netherlands 107 117
U. S, 107 106
Belgium 106 109
Denmark 105 113
Japan 105 111
West Germany 105 108
Switzerland 105 107
Italy 103 ll»f
Canada 101 107
India 101 106
Philippine 101 106
Cuba 100 n
Venezuela 99 102
Harris, ££& Incidence of Inflation 1 Or Who
*r Number Seven for the Joint Economic Co»»
Seymour E.
Gets Hurt * Study Pape
mittee of the 86th Congress in connection with their "Study of
Employment , Growth and Price Levels" (Washington! D.J. Government
Printing Office, 1959), P. 110.
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International comparisons that show the price and wage move-
ments of the United States with those of other countries gives added
insight into the need for a policy to control these factors. These
data show that inflationary pressure is a general phenomenon and that
"wage inflation" is general. 23 This does not, however, determine that
inflation is evil, but only compares relative movements on the inter-
national market.
Whether inflation of the creeping variety is evil or not in
part depends upon what form ones income is derived and how one holds
his assets. Although this injustice must be recognized, the magnitude
of this injustice should not be exaggerated as there are effective
means of offsetting these injustices. The attempts to exercise complete
price stability may lead to recessions which retard growth and cause
unemployment. The price that must be paid for preventing any infla-
tion would be chronic unemployment and government intervention in the
collective bargaining process. The monetary policy in the late fifties
led to unemployment rates as high as 6.8 percent and restricted tech-
nological innovation and growth in the attempt to control inflationary
pressures in a time of recession. A high degree of stability in the
value of money must be an important consideration of public policy.
Yet we are in considerable danger of making a fetish of rigid price
stability which could easily become a serious obstacle to optimum
expansion and growth. 2^"
23Joseph W. Garbarino, "Income Policy and Income Behavior,"
Employment Policy and the Labor Market, ed. Arthur Ross (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1965), p. 61.
^Compendium of Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing
Before the Joint Economic Committee of the 86th Congress (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 71.
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The exercise of market power in the fifties contributed to
inflation in the period under study. Market power occurs when one
or more organizations acting singly, concurrently, or jointly have
the ability through the administration of wages or prices to exact
more income for the amount and quality of labor, capital, commodity
or service supplied than could be obtained in the absence of such
organizational action. 25
This exercise of market power through administered prices
and wages may implement inflation by several ways. The markup process
through the stages of distribution pyramid the original cost in-
creases and a multiple of the cost is then reflected in the consumer's
price. Pattern setting wage and price negotiations by leading or-
ganizations contribute to inflation both laterally and vertically
through the distribution process. The final Inflationary exercise
of market power is the repetitive cycle of wage-price or price-wage
increases. Complementing these three factors is the failure of firms
to adjust price downward in response to decreases in demand.
There are essentially five types of public policy designed
to deal with this problem of inflationary considerations of market
power . 26
^Emmette S. Redford, Potential Public Policies to Deal With
Inflation Caused by Market Power, Study Paper Number Ten for the Joint
Economic Committee of the 86th Congress in connection with their
"Study of Employment, Growth, and Price Levels" (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 2.
°These five policies are those discussed by Professor
Redford in Potential ^blic Policies to Deal With Inflation Caused by.
Market Power cited previously.
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The first approach relies on corrective forces within the
economy to prevent an inflationary cycle resulting from the market
power structure. The first tributary in this stream of thought is
the reliance on the conscience and restraint of those organizations
that possess this power whether it be in the form of self-instituted
public responsibility or legal sanctions buttressed by governmental
standards. The force of countervailing power expresses the belief
in a check and balance system by forces on opposite sides of the market,
but collusion by these forces against the public interest and the
limitation in times of high demand of the countervailing consumer
power to respond weakens its applicability as public policy. The
final corrective force within the economy is the freedom of enter-
prise. This argument denies the existence of effective market power,
and even if it is recognized, the effects of this provide power more
desirable than the public power used to correct it.
The second policy approach is to use monetary and fiscal
powers to control inflation by controlling demand, but this approach
is weak in solving problems created by the existence of market powers.
This approach was used during the Eisenhower administration with the
result of trading inflationary pressures for a recession.
The next approach is the use of antitrust enforcement to
restore the competitive market. Vigorous enforcement to prevent
collusion and coercion by firms and to weaken the wage negotiation
power of unions were the means devised to restore this competitive
milieu. This approach is limited by the effectiveness of antitrust
:ceedings and the political infeasibility of destroying union
31
power and limiting business concentration.
The withdrawal of government support for market power also
has been recommended as a means of restoring competition to the
Market. These areas Include protective tariffs and quotas , resale
price maintenance laws, production controls, patent grant., govern*
ant purchasing and stockpiling measures, public utility regulations
that restrict competition and rate reduction, and collective bargain-
lag safeguards. This approach Incurs a conflict of public policy
objectives as It places inflation control in direct opposition to
tional security, industrial peace, and many other social injustices
that are not necessarily economic objectives. This economic-ieterin-
ism is not politically or socially compatible with public opinion or
public interest.
The final approach is that of public consideration of wage
ani price increases. This approach contend s that public iotercdna-
tlon of prices and wages is to be used to prevent inflation, but the
severity of such an approach varies from public surveillance to public
cosnand. The least severe of these proposals Is the requirement of
organizations that possess great market po*9T to give notice of 1
tentlon to raise prices to some public authority. This notification
of intent Is then followed by hearings or fact-finding commissions to
determine the validity of such an increase according to cost and price
factors. The transmission of the knowledge of such findings to an
informed public I then be one method of forcing public responsi-
bility on these organisations. The power of public opinion is also
strengthened by publication of advisory opinions as to the rec<
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course of action by the organization. A more severe type of public
consideration would be the delay or suspension of price or wage
increases until proper opinions are devised as to the method of
furthering the public interest. The final step in this approach
would be the use of utility-type control over some industries or
organizations to "freeze" wages or prices at the level that best
serves the public interest.
The use of public consideration of price and wage in-
creases has been accepted as the public policy to be used to halt
inflation caused by the existing structure of market power in the
economy. The wage-price guidelines have been established as the
guides for the informed public to judge the public responsibility
of such price and wage behavior in these sectors that are character-
ized by their market power. The probability of their success can
best be analyzed after considering their success in other countries
and considering the problems of application that they will encounter.
CHAPTER III
SUCCESS OF WAGE-PRICE POLICY IN OTHER COUNT IRES
Several nations in Western Europe have experimented with
various types of wage and price control measures to supplement their
monetary and fiscal policies. Although these various policies ap-
proximate the guidelines of our economy, several precautions must
be recognized before drawing comparisons.
The European experiments have had goals similar to our
wage-price guidelines, but there are many policy differences. An-
other important factor is the differences in the social and political
environment of the various countries. The difficulty of separating
one isolated policy from the entire "box of tools" of economic policy
restricts the validity of these international comparisons.
The three leading examples of European wage-price control
are Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway. The individual differences
in the policies, environments, and overall economic policies will be
noted in the appraisal of these programs in the hope that they may
enlighten the prospects for the guideposts as established in the
United States.
Norway will be discussed first as it seems to be the most
successful applicant of these policies. The dominant union in Norway
is the Norwegian Federation of Labor which is closely tied to the
Labor Party which lias been in power since the late 19^0 ' s. This re-
lationship has led unions to try to correlate their labor relations
within the desired goals of the broad national policy. The collective
bargaining process is carried on by industry-wide negotiations that
are heavily influenced by the centralized federation of labor and the
Norwegian Employer's Confederation; compulsory arbitration can be
used but is exercised infrequently to solve disputes.
The friendly relationship between the Norwegian Federation
of Labor and the government facilitates the coordination of wage and
national policy. This coordination has allowed the government to re-
frain from using direct intervention or control over the wage behavior.
Although the dominant theme in this relationship is for the establish-
ment of stabilization by wage restraint, there has been a "wage drift"
because of gain in some industry negotiations. This wage drift in-
cludes individual wage adjustments, employee overtime and other
premiums, and upgrading of workers that increase wage earnings.
The government can regulate the prices and establish the
competitive practices, whenever this is considered to be in the
public interest. 2? This general control over prices allows the
government to coordinate the trend of prices and wages. Although
most specific prices are free, the general level is determined by the
2
'Donald R. Snodgrass, Appendix to Brief Interpretive Survey
of Wage-Price Problems in Europe by Mark W. Leiserson for the Joint
Economic Committee of the both Congress in connection with their
"Study of Employment, Growth, and Price Levels" (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1959) , p. 79.
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bargaining among the different economic interest groups. The wage -
price package is an integral part of the economic planning system
that includes trade restrictions, price supports and subsidies,
investment control, and profit limitation.
The Norwegian formulation of wage-price decisions has
tended to become centralized in an essentially tripartite series of
negotiations against the background of the total national economic
situation and the whole structure of government economic policy. 2$
The trend since 1956 toward greater decentralization brought a complex
mixture of central and separate negotiations with a bit of compulsory
arbitration, but in essence wage formulation has been quite consistent
with national policy.
The Swedish national wage policy today is not as closely tied
to the government policy as Norway. The Basic Agreement of 1938 betwe en
the employers and the trade union organization, the foundation of the
whole system from which all else, including the central wage pact,
has followed was only signed under strong pressure from the authorities
with the principal motive being to prevent legislation. 29 Although
there was governmental pressures in the wage bargains, the nature of
the collective bargaining institutions in Sweden made it unnecessary
for the government to adopt wage regulation by law. The collective
2
°Mark W. Leiserson, Brief Interpretive Survey of Wage-Price
Problems in Europe , Study Paper dumber Eleven for the Joint Economic
Committee of the both Congress in connection with their "Study of
Employment, Growth, and Price Levels" (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1959), p. *fl.
29Andrew Shonfield , Modern Capitalism . The Changing Balance
of Public and Private Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965)
>
p. 199.
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bargaining in Sweden is very similar to that of Norway, but the Con-
federation of Swedish Trade Unions are not as well coordinated as in
Norway.
The separation of the national labor organization from the
government does not keep the national union from acting with public
responsibility 5 however, this does not insure a coordination of wage
policy and national economic policy. The wage negotiations in Sweden
during the war did not keep pace with the rising prices, but wage in-
creases in 19^6 and 19^7 were directed toward regaining these losses.
After these losses were recouped, a wage freeze prevailed from 19}+8
to 1950, but this restraint was broken by "wage explosions" in 1951
and again in 1955. 3^ The Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions was
responsible for the periods of restraint, but the explosions were
caused by individual union opposition to both the pleas of the Con-
federation and the government.
This see-saw process of wage freeze followed by an explosion
in a country with centralized bargaining does not seem to be a very
good guide for keeping wages in line with productivity. The magnitude
of the explosion in 1951 can best be realized by a comparison with
the 19*+8 to 1950 freeze. Sector demand for labor caused contractual
hourly earnings to increase by U-.5 percent in 19*+8 and 0.2 percent in
19^9 with no change in 1950. The wage drift raised earnings by 3.8
percent in 19^8, 2.8 percent in 19^9, and 3.9 percent in 1950.31 This
3°3nodgrass, p. 82.
31Abraham L. Gitlow, the National Wage Policy : Antec .ants
And Application (New York: New York University, 196*0, p. 25.
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era of relative restraint was followed by an increase of contractual
earnings of lV.3 percent and a wage drift of 6,h percent in 1951.
The increase in 1955 was approximately 8 percent over the previous
year. The slackening of strain on the labor market and the stable
price structure accompanied by a moderate trade union restraint re-
sulted in wage increases of 3 percent in the last two years of the
decade.
Price control by the government is exercised quite rigorous-
ly in most industries. Since 19^2 the price control board has es-
tablished maximum prices for all major commodities to keep the
wage-price behavior stable. The economy also is subject to invest-
ment control, monopoly regulations, profit taxes, and import restric-
tions. "The striking fact about Sweden is the tendency for the labor
and management organizations to provide the impulse for innovation in
the field of public policy which boldly lead, rather than follow
public opinion. "32 Perhaps the most striking example of this "mutual
advancement society" is the policy of "wage solidarity". This policy
is the promotion of killing off the inefficient industries that lag
behind the productivity of the national average. In this enlightened
program, the trade unions regard competitive pressures as something
to be accepted and used, rather than resisted. The unions are de-
termined to ride the market, but not to be driven by it. 33 in this
competitive process labor is employed in its most efficient uses;
3 2 Shonfield, p. 200.
33xbM., P. 208.
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hence, it can receive a higher rtal wage as productivity is increased
while prices are decreased by this competitive pressure. The unique-
ness of this Swedish pattern is the focus of national economic policy
on the efficient use of its labor force. The active manpower policy
of Sweden designed to increase the size and quality, and to increase
mobility of the labor force is indeed the impetus behind the full em-
ployment policy; but even in the face of such dedicated and enlighten-
ed policy, the problem of wages rising faster than productivity has
not been solved.
The Netherlands is the third study of a national economy
based on control of wages and price stability by central planning.
The Dutch have not been able to cope with the wage drift, even though
their wage controllers have statutory powers to control this behavior.
The board of government conciliators was established in 19*+5 with the
power to (1) fix general rules and principles of wage determination;
(?) set specific wage rates; (3) approvo, disapprove, or modify the
terms of collective agreements; (*f) extend the provisions of contracts
to parties outside the bargaining unit; and (5) grant specific ex-
ceptions to established wage rates. 3*+ These centralized powers are
not used in practice as the Labor Foundation serves as the focus of
national negotiations for wage policy. The Labor Foundation is
supplemented by the Social and Economic Council which is composed of
representatives of unions, employer's associations, and the govern-
ment.
&Leiserson, p. V-l.
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The wage policy mechanic operates within the superstructure
of the broad economic plan. The wage policy before 1950 was essent-
ially an escalator clause in labor contracts according to changes in
the cost of living index, but this policy had to be abandoned with
the coming of the Korean-induced Inflation. This inflation was
countered by an acceptance of a lower real wage negotiation which
brought wage increases amounting to^ only one half the price increases.
After 195^, the general improvement of the economy brought wsge in-
creases that exceeded the coat of living increases. Governmental
control of prices in the Netherlands Is exercised by the mandatory
approval by the government of any price increases. This system was
instituted in 195** and reinforced in 1963 as a prerequisite for wage
stabilization. The usual policies regarding investment f profits, and
monopolization also reinforce the wage stabilization and Integrate the
wage-price policy into the overall economic plan.
The breakdown of the Dutch system in 1963 as tjxe wag?
controllers could not contain wage increases to productivity gains
as average wages increased 8 percent per year 'and productivity only
3 percent per year. Thi activity occurred primarily because the
economic improvement in Holland had eased the fears of the people.
The postwar era had found the country somewhat unstable and stagnant
economically, but the recovery erased the fears of unemployment. With
these fears erased, the Dutch demanded wage increases to compensate
them for their years of real wage sacrifice for the national Interest.
The wage demands brought an increase in average hourly earn-
ings of 16 percent in 196*+. 35 These demands were met by the wage
honfleld, p. 213.
»+0
controllers, as they feared unrest with the entire program of economic
planning would accompany a denial of these demands. This wage increase
was accompanied by a reinforcement of indirect price controls, j ' ned
to force employers to finance greater wage concessions out of profits
to halt the wage gains.
The demands for wage increases as national prosperity re-
placed national emergency brought on a wage formula attempt. This
formula of allowing wage increases to be correlated with productivity
gains in each industry, and over the entire economy as a whole, did
not work out. 36
The wage drift problem has not been solved in either Norway
or Sweden, but Norway has had a slightly lower trend since the war.
Wage stabilization accompanied by the wage differential system of
the Netherlands was relatively successful with containment of wage
drift initially, but this problem has increased since 1958. The
following table shows the wage drift in Norway and Sweden in the post-
war years.
The experiences of these three countries in devising a wage-
price policy have been accompanied by favorable environmental factors.
These three societies have been quite cordial to economic control by
the government or by dominating private associations. This social ac-
ceptance of economic planning has facilitated the acceptance of wage-
price guides as a necessary integer for this national objective. Be-
cause of this being a national objective, the institutions and people
36Ibid .. p. 215.
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that determine the wage-price behavior of the countries have been
quite cooperative.
The ideas of laissez-faire and competition have never been
entrenched in the minds of the businessmen and labor leaders of
these lands. Although these countries have a firm democratic basis,
there are many factors which facilitate national acceptance of wage-
price controls. The relationship between labor organizations and
government is one of close connection. The close ties between the
labor organizations and the dominant political party have caused the
former to cooperate with the desires of the latter in achieving the
national goals as designed in the economic plan. The size of the
public sector of these countries also influences wage-price acceptance
because of its powers in pattern setting in the role of employer.
Another political advantage for these countries is the parliamentary
form of government. This system brings closer agreement between the
legislative and executive branches on national policy.
The small size of these three countries also facilitates
use of wage-price controls, as the number of details and administra-
tion is manageable. Perhaps the leading single factor in the favor-
able environment for these controls is the national ^nity behind the
use of such controls. The factors noted above contribute to this
cohesiveness, but the major factor was a unified fear of the future
economic condition of the country. The postwar economic conditions
of these countries were indeed bleak. The fear of depression, in-
flation, unemployment, and balance of payments crisis welded public
sentiment into the form most conducive to such control. The economic
*3
weakness of these countries and the public recognition of this fact
created a favorable climate for acceptance of such controls that
would enhance their economic future.
Even with these quite favorable factors to ensure the success
of a stable wage and price relationship, this success was indeed only-
temporary and restrictive. The general patterns noted in the experiences
in Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands were tc be correlated with the
existence of a crisis. Once the crisis had been conquered, the general
pattern would be either a wage explosion, substantial wage drifts, and
private "irresponsibility" by the people inconsistent with the desired
"public goals". The stability of the price structure of these countries
is not at all more favorable than the records of countries without such
national controls. The wage and price records presented in an earlier
section of this paper shov; that the increase of these factors exceeded
the United States 1 experience substantially.
The existence of increased demand for goods and for labor
have brought about increases for these factors that have not been con-
sistent with the national plan. The one factor than can cause such a
nationally undesired happening is the contradiction of the national
interests and the interests of the private elements in the economy.
There must be a high degree of confidence by the worker and the em-
ployer in the social, economic, and political objectives of the country.
These experiences indicate three prerequisites for an ef-
fective wage-price control: (1) "meshing" of national objectives with
private objectives; (2) a coordination of economic interests into
an integrated plan; and (3) mutual recognition and cooperation of the
representative bodies of business, labor, and government acting in
a responsible manner for the public interest*.
The experience of these European countries in the use of
wage-price controlL to establish price stability in a full-employment
economy should throw some light on the probability of sucess of such
measures in the U&nited states as a method to establish price stability.
CHAPTER IV
PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION AND PROBABILITY OF
SUCCESS OF WAGE-PRICE GUIDELINES POLICY
To properly evaluate the desirability of wage-price guide-
lines, one must first identify the probl-^.s tb&t they are designed
to cure. The proolem of seller's or cost-push inflation is not
clearly distinguishable from demand-pull inflation. The interaction
of these two concepts makes it difficult to distinguish what is
actually causing the price instability. The time sequence of wage
and price interactions do not correctly indicate the cause of the
instability. The interaction between industries and the general
price movements are also deceptive in the total economy because of
the dynamics of the economy and the structural relationships between
industries. The structure of the market and the practice of admin-
istered prices and wages add to the complexity of proper determina-
tion of wage-price relationships in practice.
The established monetary and fiscal policies have proven
quite capable of handling the demand-pull variety of inflation,
but the problem of cost-push inflation can not be corrected by these
standard tools without damaging employment and potential growth.
The European program of establishing an active manpower policy to
maintain full employment by easing the "bottlenecks" in the economy
h6
s been instituted in the United States. This policy attempts to
achieve a flexible labor force and economy which in itself solves
some of the administered pricing problems. This policy simultan-
eously attempts to solve all three problems of maximum employment,
adequate growth, and price stability, but this program can not be a
cure-all for the problem of price stability.
Another partial remedy which may be undertaken by private
interests to control this inflation would be to increase producti-
vity of the economy with research and development. This conscious
effort to increase productivity of industry and labor would allow
for a higher growth rate and an increase in real hourly earnings.
This suggestion is consistent with the historical trend of increased
productivity and real wages; however, greater efficiency, larger
volume of capital per man-hour, and better labor quality must be
accompanied by manpower policies that prevent delay and interrup-
tion of this increased productivity. The trends in real hourly
earnings and output per man-hour have run surprisingly parallel to
one another since 1900.37
Another panacea often prescribed is the strengthening of
competition in American industry. 3° Competition can be strengthened
by either direct governmental intervention by anti-trust enforcement
and withdrawal of government support of market power or indirectly
•^ 'Solomon Fabricant, "Productivity and Wages 1
,
1 Challenge
,
3r, 1962), p. 35.
3°Extract from Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee
the 86th Congress— Statement of American Bankers Associations
shington: U.S. Government Pringint Office, 1959), Part 9(b), p. 3-
^7
through governmental and public pressure objecting use of market
power that is not in the public interest. The wage-price guide-
lines are in this sense an alternative to actual reduction of size
and market power of corporations aiiu labor unions that can influence
the market because of their power. This disequilibrium of market
power allows administered prices rather than competition on a price
basis. Direct government regulation is absent and politically un-
feasible in these industries; but even if anti-trust enforcement
were possible, the movement toward smaller, more competitive in-
dustrial units would be very much against the tides of American
thought
.
Our society is a corporate society and any movement to
decentralize the economic concentration would not be readily ac-
cepted. "The conservative academicians think that freedom and
greater efficiency would result if the anti-trust laws were applied
more vigorously to big business and if a way were found to break
the market power of labor unions. Big business and big labor are
one in thinking that this 'conservative 1 solution is far more
horrible to contemplate than the guideposts. "39
Anti-trust policy could presumably prevent further develop-
ment of market power, but it could not solve the cost-push inflation
problem per se without breaking industrial complexes into atomistic
units to further competition. The economy seems to be on a pre-
carious perch in relation to wage-price inflation. A movement
toward pure competition or a movement toward central planning would
''-- II i i i || ii m i »—
«
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39»Guilding the Nation 1 s Reluctant Tigers", Business Week ,
(April 23, 1966), p. 162.
theoretically solve this problem, but both of these movements are
regarded as unfavorable by most interested parties. Voluntary
restraints by those possessing market power would allow the exist-
ing market structure to have a more stable wage-price relationships.
The wage-price guidelines would indeed be very helpful as
a standard of measurement for such voluntary restraints, but this
is analogous to the remark that there is no need for a Minister of
Bliss in a State of Bliss. ^° If big corporations and big labor did
indeed exercise the omnipotent conscience in conjunction with their
countervailing power, there would be no need for concern of wage-price
inflation; hence, no need for the guidelines. The contention that
the public can better Judge the responsibility of business and labor
with guideposts is somewhat pretentious considering the public^
general understanding of the economic phenomena that caused such
price movements. The value judgments concerning the roles played by
labor and management would not derive the true relationship between
these two conflicting parties and their influence on inflationary
pressures in the economy. The collective power of the consumer
sector is decidedly weaker than the corporate, labor, or governmental
sectors; hence, the consumer sector does not exert a powerful counter-
vailing force to insure a proper working of the "conscience" of the
other sectors. Although the attitude of "the public be damned" is
no longer prevalent in industrial circles, the conscience of the
leaders of corporations and labor are indeed very weak foundations
^John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), p. 2b".
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to rely on without competitive pressures to keep wages and prices
noninflationary
.
Business and labor have accepted guidepostism when there
has been an indirect threat or possibility of direct formal controls,
but only when such a possibility exists do these conflicting sectors
accept these measures. In general, both business and labor are
opposed to the guidelines because they insist on private decisions
to determine wages and prices as dictated by surrounding conditions
of their respective industries. The use of the guidelines as clubs
in a selective manner as in the steel settlement in September 1965
and the aluminum and copper price rollback in October, 1965* have
been very effective. This direct governmental intervention by force
of adverse public opinion, government contract "blackmail", and a
threat to release stockpiles has been effective in keeping prices
down in these industries of imperfect market power structure.
Since the announcement in 1962 of the guidelines as a non-
inflationary policy, their success has not been overly impressive.
Disregarding the club tactics in steel and aluminum, the guidelines
policy has brought some public awareness of wage-price decisions,
but the extent of this restraint can not all be attributed to the
guidelines. Since 1962, the success of the guidelines may have
been in large measure traceable to basic economic conditions which
were more or less amenable to satisfactory operation of the guides. ^1
With unemployment rather high during this period, wage demands were
not excessive. Plant capacity Mas under-utilized during this period
^Stahl, p. 10.
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and there was no pressure for prices to increase. During the period
between 1961 and 1965, productivity and output had increased sub-
stantially with unit labor costs in manufacturing stable or slightly
downward.
The price record from i960 to 1965 has been spectacular
for such an unprecedented growth period. Consumer prices increased
at an average annual rate of only 1.2 percent per year, but by 1.7
percent in 1965. 3 Much of this increase in prices was due to an
international increase in the price of nonferrous metals; this in-
crease does not affect the competitive position of the nation because
of the international nature of the increase. Another factor in the
1965 increase was the rise of food prices which were partly caused
by the production cycles in agricultural products.
The following table shows the movement of the wholesale
price index during the period from 1961 to 1965* This price record
was indeed healthy, but the increase of 2.0 percent from 196^ to
1965 after four years of stability caused worry over price stability.
The question that must be answered at this point is whether this in-
crease was of the cost-push variety. The record shows that farm and
food products accounted for 53 percent of this increase, but in-
dustrial prices moved up by 1.3 percent in 1965 after four years of
stability. Increases were found in nonferrous metals, nonelectrical
machinery, fabricated structural products, gas fuels and petroleum,
**2Ibid .
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 657"
^Ibid .. p. 67.
TABLE 8
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES, 1961-65*
Commodity Group Percentage Changes
1961-65 196^-65
Contribution to Total Change
(Percent)
1961-65 196^-65
All Commodities 2.2 2.0 100 100
Farm Products 2.5 M 12 23
Processed Foods h.k k.i 29 30
Industrials 1.7 1.3 59 h7
Textile Products
and apparel
leather 2.1 .6 7 3
Hides, skins,
leather and
products 2.8 h.h 2 3
Fuels and related
products and power -1.9 1.9 -7 7
Chemicals and
allied products -1.7
.7 "J 2
Rubber and rubber
products -3.3 Jk -2 -
Lumber and wood
products 5A .5 7 -
Pulp, paper and
allied products 1.1 .9 7 2
Metals and metal
products 5.0 2.8 31 17
Machinery and auto-
motive products Uh .8 12 7
Furniture and house-
hold products -1.5 - .5 -3 -1
Nonmetallic min-
eral products - .1 .2 - -
Tobacco products
and bottled
beverages h.h .3 5 -
Miscellaneous
products 6.8 1.6 10 3
*Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 196^77 P« 6E7"
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lumber, fertilizer materials, hides and skins, and manufactured
animal feeds. ** These sectors of the economy are not those usually
characterized by excess market power. These industries were not
victims of wage pushes that solely drove the prices of their com-
modities up, but many were victims of the market. The following
table shows the utilization rate of selected industries which may
in part explain the price increases in the affected Industrie**
Those i: !•
,
characterized by over-utilization of capacity,
may be assumed to have increasing cost conditions derived from ex-
cessive demand in relation to productive capacity.
Business leaders claim "that workers are entitled to the
guidepost wage increase, but business is not entitled to any price
advance at all*" 1^ Although this complaint i3 essentially true,
it is the theoretical basis of the guidepost policy. Although prices
would not rise, the profit rate should not fall because productivity
should increase by the amount of the wage increase since unit labor
ts are stable. Although this objection to the policy is not
correct, the emotionalism that it creates and the popular acceptance
of the objection raises a barrier to popular acceptance of guidcposts
as public policy.
Business leaders rightly point out the importance of prices
in their role of resource allocators in our market structure and the
the weakening of such a structure by "formula" pricing. To freaae
W Ibid., p. 65.
^°John Maynard Keynes, General Theory Jf
!^i "• IfififZ (••" twtlkt Muraattrt, rm orid, :../.'},
p.
TABLE 9
MANUFACTURING CAPACITY UTILIZATION, I96V-65*
Output as percent of capacity
Doc, 19oli- Dec, 1965
Preferred rate
(percent)
Total manufac-
turing 88 89 92
Iron and steel 88 75 91
Nonferrous
metals 98 103 95
Machinery 87 91 91
Electrical
machinery 8h 91 93
Autos, trucks,
and parts 95 93 96
Other transpor-
tation equipment 80 93 88
Fabricated metals
and instruments 87 91+ 92
Stone, clay, aid
glass 80 85 88
Chemicals 85 85 90
Paper and Pulp 9h 93 97
Rubber 96 9^ 9^
Petroleum and
coal products 91 91 95
Food and
beverages 86 8h 86
Textiles 96 98 9^
Miscellaneous
manufacturing 88 89 9^
*Economic Report of the President (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, i960), p. 68.
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prices without a comprehensive central plan could indeed reduce, dis-
tort, and unbalance production.
Business fears the reduction of profits by guidepost policy.
Profits are both the proof and necessary condition of our economic
system, but "it is not necessary for the stimulation of these pro-
clivities that the game should be played for such high stakes, as
lover stakes will serve the purpose equally well, as soon as the
players are accustomed to them. "^"7 The realization that profits
need not be so high as institutionally assumed would indeed help
alleviate the pressure on the price level, but profits must be high
enough to induce investment to perpetuate the existence of the system.
"The guideposts do not encourage either profits or wages to make off
with all the excess in an industry of above-average productivity,
but this does not mean that prices should fall as profits rise dur-
ing an upswing—unless the industry's trend productivity gains are
above average. "*°
Both business and labor object to the rationality of guide-
post policy of "leaping from the aggregate to the individual. "^"9
The cost-prlce-profit position of each firm is inherently different
and there is no foundation for the belief that national productivity
best distributes the "economic pie" in a noninflationary manner.
w — i m. »—»,— mm. , n i .ii i. .1 ,!— .— «..—— ! » ^ — .mm am ummmm1«— ————-» » —^ » ' »i « — —— i—— i ! »iii m ill
^?John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment f In-
terests , and Money (New York: Karcourt, Brace & World , Inc
.
, V$ T )
,
P. 37*.
1+8
John P. Lewis, "The Guideposts: Realistic and Needed",
Challenge
.
(July, 196V), p. hO.
^Neil W. Chamberlain, "The Productivity Dogma", Challenge .
(June, 196V), p. 6.
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The individual differences in each economic unit can not be facilitat-
ed in an orderly, coherent manner by guidepost modifications. Al-
though the long-run position of the firm or employee may best be
served by voluntary restraint in accordance with national productivity
trends, the separate economic actors act on the short-run factors
that are readily apparent to each. Although profits of a firm may
be excessive in the short-run only, the employees will not desire to
wait for the long-run effect of price decreases in the particular
plant or industry to best serve their welfare. The employees will
demand a wage increase at the next bargaining session, which eventual-
ly may cause a subsequent price increase in the affected firm or in-
dustry when market forces ^riange.
Labor leaders point out that the guidelines have not been
followed by the business community. Profits had been allowed to
increase since the conception of the guidelines. Profits margins
have also increased during this period; return on invested capital
after taxes in manufacturing had risen from 10.1 percent in 1961
to 13.8 percent in 1965.^ This "profit explosion" during the
period between 1961 and 1965 has caused profits to climb twice as
fast as gross national product, personal income, or wages. 51 This
points out the reality that prices have risen more than costs or
prices have not been reduced where productivity had reduced costs.
This profit growth has been used by labor unions as their
main defense against their acceptance of the guidelines. The unions
5°"Everybody 1 s Dividend", Time (May 13, 1966), p. 9h.
^Ibid.
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deem this distribution of wealth to be very inequitable; hence,
profits act as a catalyst to start wage increase demands from the
unions to restore a more equitable balance of distribution. Labor
leaders also protest wage limitations of guidelines while profits,
dividends, and executives salaries are allowed to soar. Profession-
al fees and salaries are under no guideline restraints; hence, this
huge sector is completely free to increase their incomes at will,
even though wage bargains are restricted to productivity trend of
the nation.
Both unions and business organizations use the free enter-
prise and freedom of choice approach to arouse discontent and as a
rationale to deviate from the guideposts. The restriction of free-
dom of individuals and firms by guidepost policy has indeed been a
basic rebuttal to governmental warnings of wage and price changes.
Although this plea has often been exploited by conservative factions
against all attempts of governmental intervention in the economy,
the political and emotional reactions that it brings must be con-
sidered before guidepost acceptance can be realistically analyzed.
The managed economy is not violently objected to unless there is a
subsequent loss of freedom, but the loss of freedom in the determina-
tion of wages and prices is seen by labor and business leaders as a
supreme sacrifice for a rather doubtful public policy. George Meany,
President of the AFL-CIO recently said, "The free way of life can't
be preserved on the basis of a master-servant relationship." This
52Kansas City Times . March 16, 1966, p. 18.
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response from labor is echoed in the business community. There is
also much debate and dissatisfaction with the statistical measure-
ment and general workability of productivity as a feasible standard
for wage and price determination.
The statistical limitation of productivity theory include
the conceptual problems of choosing the appropriate time interval
and the need to segregate trend movements in productivity from
changes in the level of utilization of capacity. Ghort intervals
may give excessive weights to business cycle movements and long
intervals may hide significant shifts in productivity trends. The
optimal interval and the business cycle movements must be determined
and differentiated if wage behavior is to be properly tied to pro-
ductivity.
The statistical problems involved in determining the pro-
ductivity trends are increased because of the existence of sampling,
procedural, and conceptual errors. The sampling errors are caused
by the difficulty of precisely collecting the data that corresponds
to the true population. The conceptual errors occur because of the
difficulty encountered in including all relevant data with their
proper weights, and excluding data that is not precisely relevant
to the sector to be determined. These errors include the time interval,
cyclical fluctuations, intangible variables, and the break-down into
proper component factors and industries. The procedural errors oc-
cur in the mathematical methods used to compute the trend rate of
productivity once the proper data and productivity indexes have been
accurately determined.
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Statistical improvements also need to be made in the area
of price index determination. There are major gaps in the areas of
consumer and business services, producer's goods, new construction,
and government procurement items that need to be closed for a
realistic statistical analysis concerning noninflationary guidelines. 53
Industrial breakdown of real private national income also would im-
prove the statistical reliability of movements in prices, producti-
vity, costs, and wages. The need for an enlargement of basic data
is also needed in order to compile an accurate output index or pro-
ductivity trend.
Another important consideration is the retention of adequate
incentives for employees to gain wage increases that correspond to
their increased efficiency or performance without improvements in
quality or quantity of capital goods. Other limitations on the ap-
plicability of the productivity trend rate to wages are those in-
volving job upgrading, structural shifts, and new entrants. 51* These
last three fact* r ; must be adjusted into the general guidelines or
there will be inflationary pressures. These pressures are created
by the flow of employment caused by these three factors going to
high productivity sectors of the economy; however, if they are re-
warded with their higher real wage differential, these proportions
can not be distributed throughout the economy as a general wage in-
crease. The general guidelines must be so adjusted to these wa
increases before they can be applied to the entire eco: omy without
;3john w. Kendrick, Wages . Prices . Profits and Productivity .
Part II, p. 57.
5\}itlow, p. 16.
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causing inflationary pressures, but no such adjustment has been made
in the guideline policy.
The productivity measurement of the efficiency in the use
of employed resources has many difficulties in application to main-
tain a noninflationary price level. The statistical, procedural,
and conceptual limitations of productivity measurement have been
previously discussed, but other factors that limit the applicability
of such measurements must also be noted. "In order to be valid,
arguments for the use of a productivity formula for short-term
periods must make two interrelated assumptions: (1) that producti-
vity changes constitute a reliable and reasonable criterion for wage
increases; and (2) that the measured rate of productivity change is
sufficiently stable to provide a dependable basis for wage rate
negotiations covering future periods. "55 The latter assumption was
noted in the 196*f Economic Report of the President f but there has
been no attempt to prove this assumption that national movements
of wages and productivity are correlated in the short run.
Perhaps the strongest limitation of productivity as a
standard for wage and price determination is the very nature of the
United States economy. The dynamic structure of the economy is
constantly undergoing change characterized by reallocation of fac-
tors from low to high sectors of productivity; this structural
shift in employment would then raise the productivity index. 56
This would then cause inflationary pressures or unemployment. The
^Ibid .. p. 21.
^6Ibid., p. 18.
60
application of productivity standards overrules the market forces
which determine wage rates in our society. Supply and demand for
labor must determine the distribution of income to labor regardless
of productivity changes. The established guideline policy recognizes
this fact, but they offer no explanation why the average of all such
shifts would be expected to approximate the national average rate
of increase in productivity.
"The productivity policy implies that no group has in its
power to increase its share of the nation's income by more than it
contributes to national production. Such intellectual plausibility
derives from the curiously vivid imagery invented by the classical
economists—that of a perfectly competitive economy in which the
various factors of production are each rewarded to the extent
necessary to bring out the marginal contribution required to secure
the maximum possible output of goods and services. "57 This blatant
contradiction with the structure of our economy shows that the politi-
cal element must enter into this determination. It is ironic that a
policy based on pure competition is attempted to solve a problem creat-
ed by imperfections of competition.
The next problem of application is the acceptance by the
interested parties of the particular productivity measurement that
has been chosen by the administration to be the national rule. The
rate of productivity increase may vary from two percent to four
percent, depending upon the output and input concepts used. The
five year moving average, as determined by the Council of Economic
57Shonfield, p. 218.
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Advisors increased from 3.2 to 3.6 percent in 1966, but the former
rate was arbitarily accepted as the national guideposts. This in-
consistency of time periods because of the cyclical movements
merely adds increased doubt as to the reliability of the guideposts,
regardless of the input-output concepts used.
The use of productivity as a standard for wage determina-
tion could cause severe repercussions in the area of collective
bargaining. The guidelines can in effect hinder the collective
bargaining process if either management or labor use elements of
the policy that strengthen their bargaining position; as it tends
to increase inflexibility and stubbornness of either side. If the
national productivity trend is higher than the economic stituation
in this industry or plant warrants, then labor will note the validity
of the guidelines policy and demand the national increase. Manage-
ment would in this situation disavow the guidelines or note the
modifications; hence, the end result may be a less flexible bargain-
ing process.
The loudest cry in wage disputes since the guidelines were
established has been the complaint that wages are restrained, but
excess profits are not regulated. Without wage restraints according
to productivity guidelines, the emergence of excess profits called
for a demand of wage increases; but wages should not increase un-
less national productivity also increases, regardless of the amount
of profits. Although the Council of Economic Advisors noted that
the present distribution of income was not necessarily just or
optimal, the guidelines do not attempt to solve this problem. The
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Council of Economic Advisors insisted that redistribution of in-
come should take place within the firm or industry, but that prices
should not be used to compensate for the redistribution. The policy
of voluntary self-denial is not likely to be accepted; hence, ex-
treme pressure is placed upon collective bargaining, the media of
distribution alteration.
"Since the fiction of voluntarism would be maintained,
governmental pressure would have an uneven impact. "58 The large
industries would suffer more heavily from this informal control by
government than would the smaller industries, firms, and unions
which are out of the "public eye". Government would then have to
be a party to all wage and price negotiations which would at best
be a troublesome arrangement. Guideposts would also encourage
bargaining contracts of shorter duration which could be inflationary
because of wage drifts and the elimination of the wage lag through-
out the economy.
This time dimension could cause various difficulties in
rigorous application of the guideline policy. Unions will protect
a wage lag behind productivity increases. Management would protest
paying a wage increase equal to long-run productivity increase when
market forces do not allow for wage increases. If wage increases
that were skipped in bad years are to be reimbursed in good years,
inflationary pressures would then be exerted at a time when public
policy should be combating such action.
^8Philip Taft, "Can Guidelines Solve the Problem?",
Challenge, (April, 1963), p. 10.
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The market influences of wages and prices are somewhat
neglected by guideline policy. Although the 196^- Economic Report
of the President listed modifications of guideline policy, "these
modifications are intended to apply to a relatively few cases." The
market structure essentially is then subservient to the formula of
the guideposts. The Council of Economic Advisors has not established
a cohesive link between these separate forces; subsequently, the
problems of time dimensions, collective bargaining, and individual
price movements are very much unsolved if any sector, industry, or
individual does not respond to the guideline policy.
These problems of application of a rigorous guideline policy
must be solved before there can be widespread acceptance. Perhaps
the biggest problem that must be solved is convincing businessmen
and labor leaders to abandon their primary functions of obtaining
higher profits and wages. These convictions of the leaders are
institutional phenomena, and if a new set of institutional values
are not developed, either informal or formal controls must be imple-
mented before the prescribed policy would be effective. The vague
sanctions of public opinion do not seem to be powerful enough to
force noninflationary behavior of those factors that control wages
and prices.
The political problems attendant to governmental inter-
vention in wage and price determination could also be monumental.
The gamut of interests, organizational pressures, and political
pressures that bear upon decision-making may indeed overrule any
theoretical economic advantages of guidepost policy. A recent
ft
study of European wage-price determination reported, "what once
could reasonably be thought an economic issue, to be worked out a-
mong managements, unions, and individual workers on the basis of
respective sanctions available to them at the time of the negotia-
tions has become a pawn of political interactions, diplomatic develop-
ments, and interlocking organizational interests that have long-range
status and implications. "'9 The public exhortation by the government
to restrain wage and price instability serves as a political weapon
for the group in power. This exhortation rather than command assures
the anxious public that the administration is attempting to correct
an unstable situation, but that the ultimate decision is actually
a private one. This symbolic gesture can be used as a political
tool to the disadvantage of those affected by such exhortations.
Business or labor could be pointed out as being the source of infla-
tionary pressures when in actuality it is caused by irresponsible
governmental monetary or fiscal policy. The political weapon could
also be used against either labor or business as an election promise
and payment. Such a possibility scares both the business and labor
sectors into opposition of such a policy that could bring such politi-
cal and economic consequences.
The wage-price guideline policy extended throughout the
economy is a vivid mixture of free enterprise and qua si-economic
plan. The informal or formal control depending upon the sanctions
of the government is essentially an attempt to get the "best of both
worlds". Noninflationary guidepost policy is an attempt to ensure
^^Murray Edelman and R.W. Fleming, "Unemployment and Wage-
Price Politics", Employment Policy and the? Labor Market, ed. Arthur
Ross (Berkeley: University of California "ftpess, 196?), p. 90.
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the continuation of prosperity without disruptive side effects of
instability, but private ownership or production is to be preserved
within a revised market system. The ideological aspects of planning
can not be considered if such a policy is to be adopted by the United
3tates. The pragmatic approach to prosperity must be engrained into
our society if such a progressive policy is to be adapted. The prob-
lem of managing prosperity has replaced the problem of reaching
prosperity. The obstacles that Keynesian economics and the New Deal
had to overcome to be accepted must be overcome again if this policy
is to become the dominant means of maintaining prosperity.
The crisis of the Depression paved the way for the New Deal
and later Keynesian policy, but the price record of the United States
economy during the unprecedented growth period of 1961 to 1966 offers
no such crisis to pave the way for acceptance of the guideposts.
European experience with guideline policy has one unique characteris-
tic throughout—the acceptance of these controls and the success of
such policy being accompanied by a crisis situation. Once the crisis
was overcome, price stability of the country was no longer the central
objective of the economic parties. Price and wage increases were de-
sanded once the crisis was passed as the private economic interests
became more important than the national economic objectives.
The public interest was the goal of private interests during
a period of crisis, but after the crisis the private economic actors
felt the public Interest was subservient to their own respective
••lf-interests. This situation caused price increases, wage ex-
plosions or drifts, and private "irresponsibility" because of the
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universal pursuit of private interests rather than the public interest.
European experience also shows that their price record
was less favorable than that of the United States, but attending
economic conditions in the respective countries must be recognized
with such a comparison. The noted favorable environmental factors
of the European countries were much more favorable to a national
wage-price policy than those that exist in the United States today.
The laissez-faire myth is much stronger in the United States than it
was in the European countries. The lack of this ideological barrier
greatly enhanced acceptance of such a national policy in these
countries as did other environmental factors.
The political associations and structure of these countries
also were much more conducive to acceptance of this policy than are
similar conditions in the United States. The separation of branches
of government in the United States and the lack of agreement concern-
ing the policy between the business and labor sectors with the govern-
ment creates a much less favorable environment for a united effort
than that which existed in Europe. These political factors must be
carefully considered before assessing the probability of acceptance
of such a policy. Our economy is essentially a political economy
and any economic policy must be viewed in this perspective. u The
productivity rule as a standard for wage-price decisions may be
operationally meaningful, but not operationally feasible because of
the political factors that influence its operation.
6°Emmette s. Redford, American Government and the Economy
(New York 1 Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 639.
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The political effects on the economic policy of guidelines
must not be considered lightly. "This policy implies the equivalent
of a new Social Contract: it presupposes a society in which the
different interest groups have marked out a sufficient area of
agreement about the present distribution of wealth to deny them-
selves the right to try, in the future, to obtain certain advantages
at each other's expense. "°-*- This new Social Contract is evidently
not accepted by the society of the United States at this time. This
more intimate relationship, between public and private power, is the
political meaning of planning in a mixed economy of the modern
capitalist type. fiven though the objective of guideline price
stability is not pursued at expense of business profits, business-
men viev; this policy as "an extention of traditional warfare between
the merchants and the prince who tries to force them to disgorge
their gains". °3 The political reality is that businessmen in the
United States have yet to accept the role of government in the
economy created during the depression and are not benevolent toward
any policy that increases this role of the government.
Labor leaders have taken a fervent stand against the policy
of guidepost determination. The opposition to voluntary restraints
by both business and labor would be magnified if the guidepost
policy were given formal sanctions. Without the occurrence of
major economic crisis, these factions will not accept this new
6lShonfield, p. 219.
62Ibid .. p. 33.
63lbid.
,
p. 268.
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Social Contract, but the political hope of obtaining formal sanctions
to enforce guidepost policy must be dimly viewed. Only a major
crisis of the magnitude of the Great Depression could cause the
political and ideological shift necessary to achieve such a policy.
In conclusion, the wage-price guidepost policy to be effec-
tive must be essentially a central wage and price policy to cover the
entire economy. The market power structure that causes the inflation-
ary problems is corrected only fey revising the entire wage-price
policies of the economy. This policy within the structure of the
present society is analogous to Jonathan owift's Modest Proposal ;
the social cost of the policy is regarded as being too expensive to
cure the economic malody of price instability attributable to cost-
push inflation. The guideline policy as an educational device for
public information of private actions, as originally postulated, is
politically and economically acceptable, but the use of such a policy
as a rule for wage and price decisions is not acceptable. This
policy without sanctions is not sufficient to solve the problem of
price instability, and the continuing attempt to apply this policy,
instead of developing an operational policy, only adds to the problem
of managing prosperity.
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The problem of cost-push inflation has been recognized as
a threat to price stability in the economy for several decades, but
orthodox monetary and fiscal policy has not been able to cure this
ill without damaging the level of employment and growth. Wage-price
guideline policy has been advocated to cure this price instability.
Guideline policy is marginal productivity theory applied on a
national basis; the basic principle being that wage increases
should be directly related to the national productivity trend.
With this productivity-wage relationship, prices will not be "pushed' 1
up by wage increases; the unit labor cost will remain stable and
prices can be stable. The theoretical basis of this policy is
marginalism based on perfect competition, but the nature of the
problem of cost-push inflation is the imperfect competitive structure
of the economy.
Guideline policy was officially advocated by the United
States government in 1962. Guidelines in the original policy
statement were to be an educational device to alert the public
of wage-price behavior that would be inflationary. Voluntary
restraint by those factors possessing market power was then to be
influenced by this alerted public opinion, but subsequent policy
restatements and modifications have developed powerful informal
controls.
Wage-price policies have been used in several European
countries with varying, but questionable success despite very-
favorable environmental factors. Although Walter Heller imported
guideline policy from these countries after a review of their
application and success, the social milieu in the United States
does not seem favorable to their acceptance in the United States.
The wage-price record of the United States during the period of
inflation psychosis was much healthier than that of the countries
with national wage and price policies. The nature of the infla-
tionary pressures, structure of the economy, and size of the United
States economy are completely different and less adaptable to such
a policy than were these factors in the European countries.
The statistical measurement of productivity trends has
not been developed to a high enough degree to determine all wages
and prices. Use of the productivity concept as a basis for wage-
price determination can also be attacked. The market mechanism
would be subservient to the productivity formula in guideline
policy, but replacement of the market mechanism would hinder the
allocation mechanism without offering a suitable alternative.
Economic planning and more direct governmental control of all
wage-price decisions would have to accompany a workable guideline
policy. Unless more governmental intervention occurred in the
collective bargaining process, the guidelines could indeed be
inflationary if the opposing interests used the policy as a
bargaining factor.
The political probability of popular acceptance of guide-
line policy is very minimal. This formula pricing policy is
antithetical to the popular conceptions of free enterprise and
equal opportunity. The strong opposition of the policy by both
business and labor destroys the veil of voluntarism and necessitates
direct intervention in -wage-price decisions if the policy is to
be successful. Only if price instability threatens the material
welfare of the society will this policy be accepted and applicable.
Price and wage freedom will not be traded for a formula based on
crude principles that do not solve the problem of market power
imbalance.
